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Abstract
The theory of tax smoothing and determination of public debt with uncertain future national 
income is extended for prudence. A prudent government deliberately underestimates future 
national income and the tax base, especially if the variance and persistence of shocks hitting the 
tax base are large and the tax rate and the unemployment benefit are large. As a precaution the tax 
rate is set higher and the level of public spending lower. As a result, as income and the tax base 
turn out to be bigger than budgeted, the minister of finance enjoys windfall revenues and is able 
to gradually reduce debt and debt service over time. This permits, depending on political 
preferences, either gradual cuts in the tax rate, gradual increases in government spending or a 
combination of both. It is easy to allow for government assets as well. Finally, political economy 
justifications are offered of why it is desirable to appoint a strong and pessimistic minister of 
finance. In particular, we show that prudence is able to offset the intertemporal spending, tax and 
debt biases resulting from the common-pool distortions. If the minister of finance and the prime 
minister are given as many voting rights as the spending ministers combined, the intratemporal
common-pool distortions of an excessively large public sector are eliminated as well. A strong 
and pessimistic minister of finance can thus control the impatient profligacy of squabbling 
spending ministers. However, if voters care about outcomes on election eve, prudence may be 
abused for short-run electoral gains. Opportunistic manipulation of election results, however, also 
dampens the intertemporal common-pool distortions. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
The reputation of any good minister of finance is based on prudence and caution. Nobody wants a 
spend-thrift keeper of the national budget. A good minister of finance will be forgiven if he gets 
unexpected windfall revenues, but will be scorned if the budget turns out year after year to be 
worse than expected. Just as the electorate prefers to appoint an ultraconservative central banker 
as demonstrated by Rogoff (1985), one would rather have a conservative minister of finance. The 
difference is that a central banker should be curbed as he may try to renege on previous 
announcements to keep the money supply in check while the minister of finance may be under 
pressure from his spending ministers to relax budgetary discipline. Intuitively, it thus makes sense 
to appoint a slightly pessimistic rather than an optimistic minister of finance. This insight 
underlies the advice of the so-called Studiegroep Begrotingsruimte and inspired the practice in 
the Netherlands since 1994 of deliberately underestimating future growth in the national income 
by a say a quarter or half percent in order to err on the safe side and not be surprised by 
unexpected worsening of the public finances.
1 The main objective of this paper is to formalize 
this notion of prudent budgetary policy within the context of Barro’s (1979) theory of tax 
smoothing and optimal debt management and to provide a political economy rationale for it. 
We thus allow for precautionary behaviour of the minister of finance. The objective is to 
minimize the expected value of an exponential transformation of the quadratic welfare loss 
criterion, which itself depends on the sum of tax rates squared. The coefficient of the exponential 
transformation corresponds to an Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion, which we call 
the degree of prudence. Within the context of a linear model and additive normally distributed 
errors, the optimal policy rules are linear with reaction coefficients that depend on the variances 
and covariances of the stochastic processes driving the state variables. Prudence implies that the 
policy maker plays a min-max game against nature. The policy maker hedges against undesirable 
outcomes by postulating that shocks damage its objectives even though, from a purely statistical 
point of view, they do not hurt on average.  
Our key insight is that a prudent minister of finance deliberately underestimates future 
forecasts of national income and the tax base. As a precaution the tax rate is set higher and the 
level of public spending lower than without prudence. As a result, even though budgeted tax rates 
are smoothed over time, expected values of the tax rate gradually fall and/or expected levels of 
governments spending increase over time as the inevitable windfall revenues materialize and the 
1 The new government has in 2007 abandoned prudent forecasts of national income and tax bases. Instead, 
it claims to be prudent by pursuing a more ambitious target for the final financial surplus. 2
level of government debt and thus debt service fall over time. We show that the extent to which 
this happens is greater if the degree of risk aversion (or prudence) of the minister of finance, the 
variance and persistence of shocks hitting the national income and the tax base, and the level of 
the tax rate and the unemployment benefit are relatively large. In the very long run the 
government builds up assets to generate sufficient interest revenue to pay for public spending, so 
that the expected tax rate asymptotically goes to zero.  
Another objective of this paper is to offer insights into why a minister of finance wants to 
implement a prudent budgetary policy. One reason is based on the reality of cabinet decision 
making. If there are unexpected falls in public revenue, spending ministers spend lots of time and 
energy fighting over who has to implement the spending cuts to balance the budget and the 
minister of finance is under great pressure to relax the budgetary rules. This is not conducive to 
good government. Too much time and energy is wasted on squabbling rather than on necessary 
reforms and cracking necessary tough political decisions. It is therefore desirable to have a 
prudent budgetary policy, so that on average unexpected windfall revenues are more likely than 
shortfalls in expected revenues. Another justification of why a minister of finance has more 
prudent preferences than the electorate is that ex ante the minister of finance realizes that ex post
it will be hard to discipline the spending ministers in his cabinet. Profligate spending ministers 
and a weak minister of finance give rise to a common-pool problem. This results in an upward 
bias in public spending claims, a tilt of the government spending profile from the future towards 
the present and of the tax profile from the present to the future, and thus excessive accumulation 
of government debt as in Persson and Tabellini (2000, Chapter 13) and Velasco (2000). We show 
that it is in the interest of society to appoint a relative prudent minister of finance, which can 
offset the intertemporal spending, tax and debt biases resulting from the common-pool problem.
2
If in addition the minister of finance has the unequivocal backing of the prime minister and has at 
least as many votes in the cabinet as the spending ministers combined, he also has sufficient 
power to overcome intratemporal biases resulting in an excessively large public sector.  
Section II sets up the traditional intertemporal theory of tax smoothing and determination 
of public debt and shows that government borrowing is warranted for temporary increases in 
government spending and to cover the temporary loss of tax revenues in a recession. Section III 
extends this framework to allow for a prudent minister of finance and derives our key insight 
about underestimating the tax base and the principle of precautionary taxation. Section IV allows 
2 We show that prudence offsets the intertemporal distortions caused by wanting public spending now 
rather than tomorrow and postponing taxation, but not the intratemporal distortions leading to a too large 
public sector. More precisely, prudence moves the feedback towards the open-loop Nash equilibrium. 3
for endogenous government spending and unemployment benefits and addresses the question of 
whether windfall revenues should be used for debt reduction, tax cuts or public spending hikes. 
The appendix extends prudent budgetary policy for endogenous public investment and public 
sector assets as well as public debt. Section V offers some political economy justifications of why 
it is desirable to appoint a pessimistic minister of finance and to give the minister of finance more 
voting rights in the cabinet. Section V also heeds a warning that prudence may be abused for 
short-term electoral gains. Section VI concludes and offers suggestions for further research. 
II. USING PUBLIC DEBT TO SMOOTH TAX DISTORTIONS 
We follow Barro (1979) and abstract from general equilibrium effects. Here we restate the 
traditional theory of tax smoothing to set the scene for our discussion of prudent budgetary policy 
rules in section III-V. The government budget constraint is given by: 
(1) Dt = (1+r*) Dt-1 + Gt  Wt Yt, D0 given, 
where Dt, Gt and Yt of denote, respectively, government debt, government spending and national 
income at time t, and r* is the exogenous real interest rate. With J indicating the trend rate of real 
economic growth, we rewrite (1) in terms of fractions of the trend level of national income: 
(1c) dt = E dt-1 + gt  Wt yt, d0 =D0/Y0 given,   E { (1+r*)/(1+J) > 1, 
where dt { Dt /[(1+J)
t Y 0], gt { Gt /[(1+J)
t Y 0], yt { Yt /[(1+J)
t Y 0] and E is the (gross) growth-
corrected real interest rate. The no-Ponzi condition implies that the present value of future 
primary surpluses must at least cover the current government debt:
3
(2)  11 1 lim 0          .
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Tax distortions are proportional to the square of the tax rate, so the government minimizes:
4
3 See Hamilton and Flavin (1986), Trehan and Walsh (1988), Ahmed and Rogers (1995), Quintos (1995) 
Bohn (1998) and Afonso (2005) for various unit-root and co-integration tests of whether the no-Ponzi 















subject to the present-value budget constraint (2). The optimality conditions imply that tax rates 
are smoothed over time, i.e., Wt = Wt-1.This together with (2) yields the following familiar 
expressions for the government financial deficit and the tax rate: 
(4) 1 1 ( ) ( )    and     [ ( 1) ]/ ,
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where the permanent values of detrended government spending and national income are given by, 
respectively, 
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We thus see that temporary increases in public spending (e.g., caused by a war) are financed by 
running up a government debt. In contrast, permanent increases in public spending are financed 
by an increase in the tax rate. Future increases in government spending (e.g., due to graying of the 
population) imply that the permanent level of public spending exceeds the current level of 
government spending, so the government brings down debt and debt service to pay for higher 
public spending in the future. Also, a recession characterized by a temporary fall in national 
income induces the government to run up public debt. Permanent increases in national income 
imply sustained increases in the tax base and thus allow for a cut in the tax rate. 
III. PRECAUTIONARY TAXATION AND DEBT MANAGEMENT WITH 
UNCERTAINTY ABOUT FUTURE INCOME AND TAX BASES 
To modify the traditional theory of tax smoothing discussed in section II for prudence, the 
government maximizes the expected value of an exponential transformation of criterion (3): 
4 Our framework can be given micro foundations if we assume that utility is quasi-linear and the utility of 
money is constant, labour supply and output are exogenous, production losses resulting from tax collection 
are proportional to the square of the tax rate, and households cannot accumulate assets. If we also assume 
that the government can borrow on the world markets against a given interest rate r, and the wage follows 
from the factor price frontier, expression (3) for the social welfare loss corresponds to the aggregate utility 
loss of households and the present-value budget constraint (2) is justified. One also gets a linear-quadratic 
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and T >0 indicates the degree of prudence or caution of the policymaker. The risk-neutral 
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»  as To0. Two governments may 
share the same welfare criterion under certainty, but their aversion to risk may differ. To 
capture this, the government maximizes the expected value of U(*) { exp(T *). The 
coefficient of absolute risk aversion with respect to the criterion *, i.e., T { Us/Uc>0,
also captures prudence in the sense of Kimball (1990), since Ucs=T
3 exp(T *)>0.
Prudence implies the willingness to avoid shocks with adverse consequences.
We assume an AR(1) process for deviations of national income from trend where 
U is the autoregressive parameter and the long-run expected value of yt is rigged to 1: 
(4)
2
1 1,     I N ( 0 , ) , tt t t t yy UU H H V U         1.
Temporary shocks to national income correspond to U = 0 and permanent shocks to U = 1. It is 
straightforward to allow for more general ARMA-processes for national income and the tax base 
than (4). We work with a first-order Taylor-series expansion of (1c): 
(1s) dt = E dt-1 + gt Wt W (yt  1), d0 =D0/Y0 given, 
where W indicates the long-run tax rate around which the government budget constraint is 
linearized. The government maximizes (3) subject to the government budget constraint (1s) and 
the stochastic process generating deviations of national income from trend (4). We assume that 
the variance of the stochastic shocks to detrended national income rise with the growth-corrected 
real interest rate. Hence, we have 
22 t
t VV E    where V is the standard deviation of H0. This 
ensures that the feature of time inconsistency occurring in linear-quadratic problems with 
temporal risk aversion and time discounting (van der Ploeg, 1993; Bommier, 2006) is eliminated. 
Applying the results on risk-sensitive optimal LQG-control of Speyer, Deyst and Jacobson (1974) 6
or Whittle (1981, 1990), we see that our framework yields analytically tractable closed-form 

















 ¦  subject to (1s) and (4).  
The government thus chooses the tax rate to minimize this min-max criterion and assumes the 
worst by postulating that the national income disturbances are drawn in a way that maximizes this 
criterion. The parameter T thus indicates a degree of pessimism.  
The optimality conditions corresponding to the min-max problem (5) from the perspective of time 
t onwards are (see appendix): 
(6)
22
11    and    ( ) , ,
BB B B B
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where the superscript B denotes the budgeted rather than mathematically expected outcomes. The 
second difference equation for the budgeted shocks is unstable, since _E/U_ > 1. Given that (6) also 
requires that the budgeted tax rates are smoothed over time, the budgeted underestimation of the 
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It follows from (7) that the extent by which the minister of finance underestimates shocks to the 
data generating process for the tax base is large if he is relatively prudent, variances and 
persistence of shocks are large, and the tax rate is high. Our framework deviates from the 
certainty equivalence principle which sets  0,
B
s s t H   t  and is valid only if T = 0. Substituting 
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5 See section VI for a derivation in a more general setting with endogenous government spending. 7
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Upon substitution of (9) back into the government budget constraint (1c), we obtain the expected 
mutation in the debt-GDP ratio (i.e., the expected growth-corrected public sector deficit): 
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The key insight is thus that a prudent minister of finance underestimates future GDP and thus 
underestimates the future tax base and tax revenues. As a consequence, the minister sets a higher 
tax rate just to be on the safe side. This may be referred to as precautionary taxation. The 
statistically speaking inevitable future windfall revenues permit gradual reductions in public debt 
and thus also gradual reductions in debt service and the tax rate (on top of any gradual debt 
reductions necessary to finance efficiently projected increases in government spending). Hence, 
prudence implies a departure from the principle of tax smoothing. 
CASE: TEMPORARY SHOCKS 
The case of temporary shocks corresponds to U = 0 and yt = 1 + Ht. It follows that the minister of 
finance deliberately budgets future levels of national income and the tax base that are lower than 
the statistically expected value of national income and the tax base: 
(8c)
22 1 ( ) 1   if    0.
BB
tt y TV W W TV    !
We see that the expected deficit is less than the temporary level of government spending or the 
expected surplus is greater than is warranted by projected increases in government spending, 
especially if the degree of prudence and the variance of shocks to the tax base are relatively large: 
(10c)
22
11 1 1 () ( 1 ) (
PP
ttt tt t ttt t Edd gg y gg y WT V W W W             8


















 !   ¨¸  ©¹
TV !
We note that temporary shocks in national income do not affect the level of taxation, but do affect 
the deficit. In other words, a temporary fallback in the national income and the tax base is 
accommodated by a higher deficit, not by a higher tax rate. 
CASE: PERMANENT SHOCKS 
The tax rate and expected budget deficit for a prudent minister of finance facing permanent 
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In contrast to temporary shocks, permanent shocks to the national income and the tax base are 
accommodated by the tax rate. A permanent fall in national income thus induces a permanent 
increase in the tax rate and no change in the deficit. The correction for prudence is much greater 
for permanent than temporary shocks, so that the precautionary level of taxation is higher.  
In general, we see from (7) that a higher degree of persistence of stochastic shocks to the national 
income implies that the budgeted underestimation of the tax base is larger. Persistent shocks thus 
make a minister of finance more prudent. The higher the degree of persistence of shocks to the 
national income and the tax base (higher U), the higher the extent of precautionary taxation and 
the higher the resulting reductions in government debt. 9
IV. PRUDENT BUDGETARY POLICY WITH ENDOGENOUS PUBLIC SPENDING
In practice, ministers of finance must deal with the issue of endogenous government spending and 
the bill for unemployment benefits. They also have to answer the question of whether windfall 
revenues arising from a prudent budgetary policy should be used for debt reduction, tax cuts or 
public spending hikes. We thus replace the government budget constraint (1c) by: 
(11)  dt = E dt-1 + gt + bt [u + D (1  yt)]  Wt yt |Edt-1 + gt + u bt  Wt + (W+Db) (1  yt),
d0 =D0/Y0 given,   E { (1+r)/(1+J) > 1, D > 0, 
where bt indicates the level of the unemployment benefit, b stands for the long-run value of the 
unemployment benefit, and u denotes the equilibrium level of unemployment. Okun’s law states 
that D (1  yt) + u captures the level of unemployment.
6 With a positive effect of pure public 
goods on social welfare, the criterion that needs to be maximized subject to the (linearized) 
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where 0 tt gg !!  indicates the bliss level of public spending and F > 0 denotes the relative 
priority attached to higher public spending rather than lower tax rates. The optimum min-max 
outcome is characterized by smoothing of the tax rate as before, by smoothing of shortfalls of 
public spending from its bliss value, and by a budgeted data generating process for the errors in 
national income and the tax base (see appendix): 
(6c)
2
1 ,      and    [ ( )] , .
BB B B B B B
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Using the same arguments as in section 3, we find that the budgeted error in the data generating 
process for the tax base is larger than before: 
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The degree of underestimation of the tax base is thus also large if the level of the unemployment 
benefit is large. The higher the tax rate and the unemployment benefit level, the more sensitive 
tax revenues are to business cycle variations and thus the more prudent the minister finance has to 
be. In addition to the dynamic efficiency conditions, the optimum must also satisfy the following 
static efficiency condition: 
(12)  ()
BB
tt t . gg WF  
The marginal cost of a higher budgeted tax rate must thus equal the marginal benefit of a higher 
level of public spending. In other words, a high tax rate or cost of public funds implies a low 
demand for public goods. Upon substituting (8s) and (12) into the present-value government 
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where  indicates the permanent level of the unemployment benefit. If one expects the 
unemployment benefit rate to be cut in the future, it is optimal to set a relatively low tax rate and 
P
t b11
run a temporary deficit. Endogenous government spending does not affect the determination of 
public debt very much, except that more right-wing governments with a lower value of F tend to 
have lower tax rates and thus their correction term for prudence is smaller as well. We see from 
(12) that now not only do we have as a precaution a higher tax rate, but also a lower level of 
public spending. Over time the minister of finance will inevitably enjoy windfall revenues, so that 
the tax rate gradually falls and the level of public spending gradually increases as debt service 
diminishes. Figure 1 shows what happens with a permanent fall in the level of national income. 
FIGURE 1: PRUDENT REACTION TO PERMANENT FALL IN THE TAX BASE 
debt T = 0 
debt T > 0 
tax rate T = 0 
tax rate T > 0 
spending T = 0 
spending T > 0 
time 
national income 
On impact the tax rate is higher and the level of public spending is lower than in the absence of 
prudence. As a result, on average the government can expect windfall revenues that enable debt 
to be paid off. The accompanying fall in interest payments permit a gradual rise in public 
spending and fall in the tax rate. In the very long run the government builds up assets in order to 
generate just sufficient interest revenue to pay for each period for the long-run level of public 
spending. This implies, in sharp contrast to the traditional tax smoothing result of Barro (1979), 
that the tax rate converges asymptotically to zero. 
Since many European governments have tried to satisfy the Maastricht norms for the 
deficit-GDP and the debt-GDP ratios by selling public sector assets, it is interesting to extend our 
analysis to allow for public sector capital (see appendix). The present-value government budget 
constraint now states that the net worth of the public sector must be sufficient to cover the excess 12
of public spending plus losses on public sector capital over tax revenues as in Buiter (1985). 
Selling public sector capital and using the proceeds to reduce government debt therefore does not 
necessarily improve the net worth of the public sector. Although the current financial deficit 
improves, any future income or utility derived from these public sector assets will be forsaken. 
The key insight is that prudence induces precautionary taxation and underspending of public 
goods and public sector capital. As a result, the net worth of the public sector increases over time 
and the government can be expected to gradually lower the tax burden and gradually raise 
spending on consumption goods and capital. 
V. CASE FOR A STRONG AND PESSIMISTIC MINISTER OF FINANCE? 
If the electorate itself is prudent, it makes sense for a benevolent government to be prudent as 
well. In practice, there are also political reasons why a government might want to employ a more 
prudent budgetary policy than its citizens. Let us therefore assume that household preferences do 
not display temporal risk aversion and see whether there may nevertheless be a reason for the 
government to act prudently. Governments want to spend as much of their time and energy on 
important and necessary economic and political reforms and cannot afford to spend their time and 
energy on useless matters. However, whenever there are unexpected falls in public revenues, 
ministers taking care of the spending departments fight over who must implement the spending 
cuts to balance the budget and the minister of finance is pressurized to relax the budgetary rules. 
In contrast, if there are windfall revenues, the cabinet members find it easier to agree on what to 
do with them. The government therefore finds it attractive to have a prudent budgetary policy, so 
that on average unexpected windfall revenues occur more frequently than shortfalls in expected 
revenues and more time and energy is left for important political issues. 
Another justification highlights why it is attractive to appoint a strong minister of finance with 
more pessimistic preferences than the electorate and his spending colleagues. Ex ante the minister 
of finance realizes that ex post it is tougher to discipline the spending ministers in his cabinet. If 
the minister of finance is not in firm control, the unfettered claims of the spending ministers give 
rise to a common-pool problem. This implies an upward bias in public spending and excessive 
accumulation of government debt as discussed in Persson and Tabellini (2000, Chapter 13.1 and 13
13.2).
7 It also leads to a departure from tax smoothing, since spending ministers try to defer 
taxation. Such biases occur as each spending minister is trying to get its hands on scarce public 
revenue before the other spending ministers get a chance to do so. Given these spending, tax and 
debt biases, the minister of finance may find it especially advantageous to deliberately 
underestimate the future tax base and induce precautionary taxation and underspending. More 
precisely, a minister of finance can strengthen his position in the cabinet by implementing a 
pessimistic budgetary policy to offset the biases resulting from the common-pool problem. It is 
thus in the interest of society to appoint a prudent minister of finance. 
To make the point, we allow for N spending ministers. To keep matters simple, we 
abstract from public sector capital and unemployment benefits and assume only two time periods. 
If there is no inherited debt and the rate of interest and the discount rate are zero, we have H1 = d0
= d2 = 0 and E = 1. The present-value government budget constraint is thus given by:  
(15) 
2
11 1 2 22 2
11
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where gti stands for the level of spending by minister i at time t. We focus on symmetric outcomes 
and assume that priorities and bliss values are time-invariant and the same for each public 
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The minister of finance minimizes the expected value of the sum of the welfare loss functions of 
each of the spending ministers and also postulates that future disturbances are drawn to hurt 
social welfare. We first consider the cooperative outcome, where the minister of finance and the 
spending ministers jointly minimize the expected value of the social welfare loss L1 + .. + LN
subject to (15) in the absence of prudence. We then contrast this with the non-cooperative 
7 Von Hagen and Harden (1995) argue that the spending bias resulting from fiscal illusion (i.e., the 
overestimation of the benefit of a particular activity) may be contained by appropriate budgetary processes, 
which depend on what kind of uncertainty dominates the budget process. Another way to constrain 
profligate spending ministers is to delegate authority to monitor and punish to the minister of finance. 
Hallerberg and von Hagen (1997) argue that this works better in countries with non-proportional 
representation and one-party states. Swank (2002) shows that the appointment of a spending-averse 
minister of finance is better than binding budget targets imposed by the prime minister, because it induces 
spending ministers to propose less ambitious budgets as well as to appoint less spending-prone bureaucrats. 14
outcome in the absence of prudence where spending ministers lead in their spending claims and 
the minister of finance follows in setting the tax rate and public debt. We show that the non-
cooperative outcome leads to the following distortions: a tilt towards future rather than present 
taxation, a tilt towards present rather than future government consumption, excessive 
accumulation of government debt, and an upward bias in total public spending and the average 
tax rate. We finally analyze what happens if a strong and pessimistic minister of finance is 
appointed to control the squabbling spending ministers. A strong minister of finance is necessary 
to overcome the intratemporal bias towards excessive public spending while a pessimistic
minister of finance is necessary to mitigate the intertemporal bias of spending too soon and 
taxing too late. A strong minister of finance effectively has as much power as all his spending 
colleagues together. Precautionary taxation allows for a gradual reduction in government debt. It 
also leads on average to expected windfall revenues, so that over time the level of public 
spending can rise and the tax rate can fall. Prudence is thus able to offset the intertemporal 
distortions arising from the dynamic common-pool problem. 
COOPERATIVE OUTCOME 
It is easy to show that the cooperative outcome in the absence of prudence is characterized by: 
(17)
 12 2 1 2 1 22
1 2 22 22 1
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where superscript C indicates the cooperative outcome. It is optimal ex ante for the social planner 
to smooth the levels of public spending and the tax rate over time. Since there are no changes in 
the targets for government spending or the tax base over time, there is no need for government 
debt. A bigger priority to public goods F leads to higher spending and tax rates. 
OPEN-LOOP NASH OUTCOME 
One way to calculate the non-cooperative outcome is to assume pre-commitment of each 
spending minister to future spending levels. The resulting open-loop Nash equilibrium is: 
(18) 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where the superscript O indicates the open-loop Nash outcome. In the non-cooperative outcome 
with pre-commitment, we see that spending and tax rates are higher than in the cooperative 
outcome. Since spending ministers are only concerned with their own budget, they do not take 
fully account of the tax distortions caused by the total budget. Tax rates and public spending 
levels are smoothed, so there is no need for government debt. Hence, there are no intertemporal
distortions, only intratemporal distortions in the open-loop Nash outcome. It is easy to see that, if 
the minister of finance and the prime minister together get just as much votes as the spending 
ministers combined, the open-loop Nash outcome becomes the cooperative outcome and the 
intratemporal distortions leading to an excessively large public sector are eliminated. 
FEEDBACK NASH OUTCOME 
It is more realistic to assume that there is no pre-commitment in which case the feedback Nash 
outcome is appropriate. We use dynamic programming to ensure subgame perfection. Working 
backwards each spending minister takes past government debt and spending plans of his 
colleagues as given. Minister i thus solves in the second period:  
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where we have substituted the second-period budget constraint from (15). The optimal reaction 
function for minister i is thus given by: 
(20) 
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so that he spends more if there is a small outstanding debt and a positive income shocks. If his 
colleagues spend more, the cost of funds goes up and he spends less. The resulting symmetric 
feedback Nash equilibrium for the second-period level of spending and the tax rate is given by: 
(21)  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where the superscript N indicates the feedback Nash outcome. Turning to the first period and 
substituting the first part of (15) and (21) into (16) , we see that minister i chooses first-period 
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The finance minister chooses the tax rate W1 to minimize L1 + .. + LN . The resulting first-order 
conditions are: 
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This states that the marginal cost of taxation must equal the marginal benefit of public goods in 
the first period and also equal the marginal cost of public debt (i.e., the marginal cost of lower 
spending and higher taxes in the future). The resulting symmetric feedback Nash equilibrium 
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Due to the linear-quadratic-Gaussian nature of the optimization problem and the absence of 
prudence, certainty equivalence applies so optimal first-period spending and debt can be obtained 
by setting the future income shock to its expected value of zero. Upon substitution of (24) into 
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As long as N > 1, we can easily establish the following results:.  
(25) 
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From (25) and (21c) we see that the feedback Nash outcome suffers from two types of distortions. 
First, the sum of spending levels and of the tax rate over the two periods is the same as in the 
open-loop Nash equilibrium and thus higher than in the cooperative outcome. This is the familiar 
intratemporal distortion towards an excessive public sector. Second, government consumption is 
tilted towards the first period, taxation is tilted towards the second period, and, as a consequence, 
there is excessive government debt. These are the intertemporal distortions. In fact, spending in 
the first period is bigger in the feedback Nash than in the cooperative outcome.
8 Because each 
spending minister (or group of a coalition) decides part of the budget and nobody controls the 
aggregate budgetary outcome, ministers spend too much and too soon and postpone taxation with 
the result that borrowing is too high. These two types of common-pool distortions arise from the 
lack of a proper definition of property rights to tax revenues.  
It is interesting to note that the common-pool distortions worsen when the number of 
spending ministers increases. More claims on the common budget worsen the biases to spend too 
much and too soon and postpone taxation. Also, comparing (21c) with (17), a positive shock to 
national income induces a smaller increase in public spending and the tax rate in the non-
cooperative outcome. Finally, the expected welfare loss is obviously greater in the feedback Nash 
than in the open loop Nash and a fortiori than in the cooperative outcome. 
PRUDENCE CAN HELP TO CONTROL PROFLIGATE SPENDING MINISTERS 
Now we introduce prudence into the feedback Nash outcome and show that this can improve 
social welfare. This implies that the cabinet deliberately depresses the forecast of future national 
income and the tax base. The finance minister is pessimistic and solves the min-max problem: 
C
i
8 Also, if F(2F+N) > N
2, we establish that  21 2 E( ) .
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This gives rise to the following first-order conditions: 
(23c) 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Using (23c) and (21c) to substitute expressions for all variables in terms of W1 into the present-
value budget constraint yields the following expressions for the first-period tax rate and level of 
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where superscript P indicates the prudent outcome. Expression (27) indicates that the minister of 
finance deliberately underestimates future income to be on the safe side. Second-period public 
spending and the tax rate follow readily from the second-period government budget constraint: 
(28) 
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To understand how prudence and a strong minister of finance can offset the intertemporal and 
intratemporal common-pool distortions, Table 1 calculates feedback Nash outcomes for varying 
degrees of prudence and compares them with the cooperative and open-loop and feedback Nash 19
outcomes in the absence of prudence. The open-loop Nash equilibrium only suffers from 
intratemporal distortions: governments spending and tax rates are higher than in the cooperative 
outcome, but there is no excessive debt accumulation. To get rid of the bias in the open-loop 
Nash equilibrium it suffices to give the minister of finance at least as many votes in the cabinet as 
the spending ministers combined (i.e., reduce F to F/N). The feedback Nash outcome gives rise to 
the intertemporal distortions of spending too soon and taxing too late. It thus leads to excessive 
debt accumulation. Prudent budgetary policy clearly is able to offset the bias of spending too 
much and too soon and the resulting debt bias. By deliberately budgeting the future national 
income and tax revenues too low, the minister of finance forces his spending colleagues to spend 
later, to not postpone taxation and accumulate less debt. As the degree of prudence T increases, it 
is optimal to spend less today and more tomorrow, to borrow less and to have a lower tax rate. If 
TV
2 is about 0.35, the debt bias completely disappears and the feedback Nash outcome with 
prudence has become close to the open-loop Nash outcome. The final rows show that with a 
strong and even more pessimistic minister of finance it is possible to mitigate all the 
intratemporal and intertemporal welfare losses arising from the common-pool problem. 
TABLE 1: PRUDENCE AND STRONG FINANCE MINISTER 
MITIGATE THE COMMON-POOL PROBLEM 
  Ng1i  Ng2i      d1 W1 W2 2
B H    Li
Cooperative 0.3333 0.3333  0 0.3333  0.3333  0 0.2
Open-loop Nash  0.4286  0.4286  0 0.4286 0.4286  0 0.2204 
Feedback Nash  0.4418  0.4154  0.0462  0.3956 0.4615  0 0.2217 
Prudent TV
2W = 0.1  0.4386 0.4186  0.0350 0.4036  0.4536  0.0807  0.2212 
Prudent TV
2W = 0.2  0.4352 0.4219  0.0233 0.4119  0.4452  0.1648  0.2207 
Prudent TV
2W=0.35 0.4300 0.4272  0.0050 0.4250  0.4321  0.2975  0.2204 
Prudent TV
2W= 0.4  0.4282 0.4292 0.0014 0.4296 0.4275  0.3437  0.2204 
Strong and prudent 
F = 2.5, TV
2W= 0.4 
F = 2.5, TV















Parameters: W = g  = 0.3, F = 5 and N = 2. 20
WARNING: PRUDENCE MAY SOLICIT ELECTORAL BUDGET CYCLES 
Many governments adopt a ‘first-sour-then-sweet’ policy whereby unpopular policies such as 
raising tax rates and trimming public spending are implemented immediately upon election into 
office while popular policies of cutting tax rates and boosting public spending occur just before 
the next election. There may be short-run political benefits from loosening budgetary discipline 
just before an election, but only if citizens are myopic.
9 Such opportunistic political manipulation 
is made possible by the assets accumulated from precautionary taxation. By reducing government 
debt and accumulating assets, the minister of finance builds up a buffer that can be used to cut 
taxes and boost public spending towards election eve. As long as this is not overdone, electoral 
cycle motivations may help to offset the intertemporal common-pool distortions of spending too 
soon and taxing too late. However, there is always the danger that excessively large buffers are 
accumulated by the minister of finance in order to dish out excessively big tax cuts and spending 
hikes on election eve for short-run political gains.
10 Short-run political manipulation of election 
results may thus lead to an excessively prudent budgetary policy. To see this, we assume that the 
electorate suffers from memory loss and judges the government more on how well it has done on 
election eve than at the start of the term of office. We thus change the weight on second-period 
welfare losses in (16) from 1 to 1+S with S>0 and recalculate the outcomes of Table 1. It is easy 
to show that this induces an electoral business cycle with higher taxes and lower spending upon 
moving into office and lower taxes and higher spending just before the next election. Clearly, the 
government has an incentive to build up assets towards election eve in order to dish out favours to 
the voters. Table 2 confirms these results and indicates that for small values of S it is possible to 
have a welfare improvement, but for large values of S opportunistic political manipulation is 
excessive and leads a deterioration of welfare. In other words, if the electorate ‘forgets’ past 
                                                
9 The pioneering work of Nordhaus (1976) on the political business cycle is based on myopic citizens. 
Opportunistic, pre-election manipulation of the expectations-augmented Phillips curve creates jobs on 
election eve while the inflationary effects appear after the election. Apart from not fitting the empirical 
facts very well as discussed by Drazen (2000), it is unlikely that people are foolish and irrational enough to 
be manipulated in such a way. Also, electoral cycles seem to be driven more by fiscal policy than monetary 
policy. Rogoff (1990) rationalized such opportunistic, pre-electoral manipulation by assuming that there is 
imperfect information about an incumbent’s competence. In such a context expansionary policy before an 
election indicates high competence. Partisan differences about the size of the public sector or the nature of 
public goods can also induce a pre-election debt bias; e.g., Persson and Tabellini (2000, Chapter 13.3). 
10 Indeed, the ‘prudent’ finance minister Gerrit Zalm has been accused of being tough in post-election years 
but exuberant and irresponsible in each pre-election year. Critics such as Jacobs (2007) and Beetsma and 
van Wijnbergen (2007) argue that under his reign the structural deficit and volatility of output and 
consumption have increased, but that he was ‘saved’ by the extra gas revenues resulting from temporary 
high oil prices. Minister Zalm may thus have abused his ‘prudent’ budgetary policy for short-run electoral 
gains. The same critics complain that minister Zalm has in election years immediately converted temporary
windfall revenues in permanent tax cuts (1998, 2005) or public spending hikes (2001). 21
outcomes quickly, electoral budget cycles are more likely to reduce welfare. Short-run   
manipulation of election outcomes ensures, like prudence, more effective political decision 
making and makes it possible to control squabbling spending ministers, but not if the reduction of 
public debt or the accumulated assets induce excessive electoral budget cycles to the detriment of 
social welfare. If the effective discount rate of the past by the electorate equals 1/1.1666 = 0.857, 
the opportunistic electoral outcome exactly reproduces the open-loop Nash outcome. In that case, 
the intertemporal common-pool distortions are exactly offset by opportunistic manipulation of 
election results. 
TABLE 2: OPPORTUNISTIC MANUPILATION OF ELECTION OUTCOMES 
  Ng1i  Ng2i      d1 W1 W2     Li
Open loop Nash  0.4286  0.4286  0 0.4286 0.4286 0.2204 
Feedback Nash  0.4418  0.4154  0.0462 0.3956  0.4615  0.2217 
Electoral S = 0.1  0.4336 0.4235  0.0176  0.4160 0.4412 0.2206 
Electoral S = 0.5  0.4071 0.4500 0.0750 0.4821 0.3750 0.2239 
Electoral S=0.1666  0.4286 0.4286  0.0000  0.4286 0.4286 0.2204 
Parameters: W = g  = 0.3, F = 5 and N = 2. 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The principles of sound prudent budgetary policy require  that the minister of finance deliberately 
underestimates the future level of the national income and the tax base. The degree to which this 
should be done is bigger if the minister of finance is more prudent, the variance and persistence of 
shocks hitting national income and the tax base are large, and the level of the tax rate and the 
unemployment benefit are large. The principle of precautionary taxation thus requires that the tax 
rate is set higher than it would have been done otherwise. Similarly, as a precaution the level of 
public spending is set lower. As a result, the minister of finance is more likely to enjoy windfall 
revenues rather than a shortfall of revenues. The government debt is therefore likely to fall over 
time. The associated reduction in debt service permits, depending on political preferences, either 
a gradual reduction in the tax rate, an increase in the public spending or a combination of both. In 
the long run the tax rate converges to zero as public spending is financed by interest income on 
government assets. This is in sharp contrast to the traditional principles of tax smoothing. 22
An important advantage of prudent budgetary policy is that it generates peace and quiet 
in the council of ministers. Without prudent forecasts of national income and the tax base, the 
likelihood of unexpected falls in tax receipts and consequent budgetary fights is much bigger. The 
ministers then waste a lot of time and energy on squabbling to try to offload the costs of further 
cuts on their colleagues. That time and energy would have been much better spent on important 
policy issues and reforms. With spending ministers squabbling over a common pool of public 
revenues, it is attractive to give the minister of finance at least as much voting rights in the 
cabinet as all the spending ministers combined. This eliminates the intratemporal common-pool 
distortions of an excessively large public sector. The minister of finance should also adopt a 
prudent budgetary policy to avoid spending too soon and taxing too late. This effectively gets rid 
of the intertemporal common-pool distortions. A strong and pessimistic minister of finance can 
thus control the claims of his spending colleagues and avoid excessive debt accumulation.  
It is straightforward to extend the present framework to allow for uncertainty about future 
projections in the actual or desired levels of public spending, future returns on public sector 
capital or future interest on public debt and to allow for more general data generating processes 
for national income and the tax base. It would then be prudent for the minister of finance to 
budget for slightly higher levels of future government spending and the market rate of interest 
and for slightly lower levels of future financial returns on public sector capital than the 
mathematically expected levels. Again, the minister of finance will on average enjoy less 
ambitious spending desires and higher returns as well as windfall revenues than budgeted as time 
proceeds and is thus able to gradually cut debt service and the tax rate. It is also easy to allow for 
quadratic costs of adjustment for the stock of public sector capital or the level of government 
spending. It is also interesting to abandon the assumption of an exogenous data generation 
process for national income and allow for adverse effects of the tax rate on the tax base. The 
marginal cost of taxation is then likely to increase in recessions and fall during booms. This 
strengthens the case for a prudent counter-cyclical policy. Also, the structural unemployment rate 
may be positively affected by taxation. This also strengthens the case for such a prudent policy, 
because one does not want to increase tax rates in a recession as this would increase 
unemployment even further. 
To allow for a general equilibrium setting with fully specified micro-founded behaviour 
of households and firms and flexible wages and prices requires numerical approximation 
algorithms that use linear-quadratic approximations of the model and the welfare function at 
every iteration. More interesting is to investigate how measurement errors in the national income 
and the tax base affect the principles of tax smoothing and the optimal determination of public 23
debt. Whittle (1981, 1990) shows that it is possible to decouple the stages of risk-sensitive 
optimal control and optimal prediction with the aid of a risk-sensitive Kalman-Bucy filter. In 
future work we will use these techniques to modify our results on prudent budgetary policy. 
Prudence favours the accumulation of assets to cope with future risk, but then it is 
optimal to spend less on actions to prevent risk with adverse consequences (e.g., Eeckhoudt and 
Collier (2005)). Similarly, a prudent minister of finance who has accumulated a big buffer is less 
likely to take actions to prevent the tax base from shrinking and is more likely to dish out favours 
towards election eve. It is therefore interesting to further develop the rationale for a strong and 
prudent minister of finance within the context of a political business cycle framework with finite 
election horizons. In practice, newly elected governments adopt a finite horizon, typically the 
period to the next election, and set themselves a target for the final financial deficit or surplus.
11
The key question is under what conditions prudent budgetary policy improves welfare. We have 
shown that this occurs if the electorate does not ‘forget’ too quickly and gives sufficient weight to 
outcomes immediately upon entering office. If the electorate ‘forgets’ quickly, the adverse 
welfare effects of short-run political manipulation will dominate the beneficial welfare effects of 
offsetting the intertemporal biases of the common-pool problem.  
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APPENDIX
SOLUTION OF THE MIN-MAX PROBLEM 
The min-max problem with endogenous government spending can be solved as follows. The case 
of exogenous public spending corresponds to Fof, i.e.  . t gg t    The Lagrangian is given by: 
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where Ot and Pt indicate the (undiscounted) shadow prices of government debt and national 
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Combining the first and last first-order conditions yields: 
2
1 () , tt t b UH EH TV E W D W W      t
Given that T > 0, we can verify that the first-order conditions indeed characterize a min-max 
solution. Denoting the optimal budgetary outcomes by the superscript B and generalizing to the 
perspective from time t rather than time 1 onwards, we see that the first-order conditions give rise 
to (6c) and (7c) or (6) and (7) in the text. 
PRUDENT BUDGETARY POLICY AND PUBLIC SECTOR ASSETS 26
We introduce public sector investment it and public sector capital kt (both detrended) and modify 
the government budget constraint as follows: 
dt = E dt-1 + gt + it + bt [u + D (1  yt)]  Wt yt + rk t, d0 =D0/Y0 given, 
where r indicates the financial return on public sector capital. If G is the depreciation rate of 
public sector capital, the dynamics of net worth of the public sector vt { kt  dt can be written as: 
vt = E vt-1 + Wt yt  gt  bt [u + D (1  yt)]  lt, lt { (E + G r) kt, v0 =(K0 D0)/Y0 given, 
where losses on public sector capital lt indicate the amount by which the financial return (net of 
depreciation) on those assets falls short of the growth-corrected real interest rate. If there are no 
Ponzi games, the present-value budget constraint of the public sector is: 
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If public sector capital earns a market rate of return, losses are zero and public sector capital can 
be debudgeted from the flow and present-value budget constraints. If the financial return on 
public sector capital net of depreciation falls short of the market rate of interest, lt > 0. In that 
case, public sector capital must contribute to social welfare for otherwise there would be no 
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where 0 tt kk !!  is the bliss level of public sector capital and [ > 0. The optimality conditions 
(6c), (7c) and (12) and the equation for the budgeted tax base (8s) are as before. The novel feature 
is that the optimal capital stock is given by: 

1 ,. ss t kk r s t [E G W
     t
The optimum public sector capital stock is thus high if the tax rate and the cost of funds are low. 
It is also high if the return on public sector capital r is high. Upon substitution of this and (6c), (7c)
and (12) into the present-value budget constraint, we obtain: 
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Prudence still requires precautionary taxation. As a result, the expected net wealth of the public 
sector increases over time. The government is thus able to gradually lower the tax rate and 
increase spending on consumption goods and capital. 